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 The Honorable John R. Padova, United States District Judge for the Eastern*
District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
            
No. 04-3811
            
LARRY W. AUSTIN,
Appellant,
v.
THOMAS CARROLL, Warden; OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
DELAWARE,
Appellees.
          
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D.C. No. 03-854)
District Judge: Honorable Joseph J. Farnan, Jr.
         
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a),
December 13, 2006
Before: FUENTES and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges, and 
                          PADOVA,  District Judge*
(Filed February 27, 2007  )
 We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253.  Our review of1
a district court’s dismissal of a habeas petition on statute of limitations grounds is plenary. 
LaCava v. Kyler, 398 F.3d 271, 275 (2005).
2
_____
        OPINION OF THE COURT
         
FUENTES, Circuit Judge.
Petitioner Larry Austin appeals from an order of the District Court dismissing his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus as time-barred.  For the reasons set forth below, we
will affirm the District Court’s decision.1
I. Background
In March 2000, after Austin failed to appear for the second day of his criminal
trial, a Delaware jury convicted him in absentia of all counts of a four-count indictment
charging him with various controlled substance offenses.  Austin was apprehended by
police several months later, and was thereafter sentenced to thirty-two and one-half years
imprisonment.  
Austin filed a timely pro se appeal with the Delaware Supreme Court, which
affirmed his conviction and sentence on August 6, 2001.  Austin did not file a petition for
certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, but did file a pro se motion for state post-
conviction relief (“state PCR motion”) in Delaware Superior Court on August 12, 2002. 
 Austin asserts that he mailed the corrected motion on September 14, 2002. 2
Whether he is deemed to have filed the corrected motion on that date, or on September
18, 2002, when the court received it, is irrelevant to the issues raised in this appeal. 
3
Approximately two weeks later, however, the Delaware Superior Court sent Austin a
notice of non-compliance informing him that he had failed to use the correct form.  On
September 18, 2002,  Austin filed a corrected state PCR motion which the Delaware2
Superior Court ultimately denied on the merits.  On July 7, 2003, the Delaware Supreme
Court affirmed the Superior Court’s denial of state post-conviction relief.  
On August 31, 2003, Austin filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus in
the United States District Court for the District of Delaware alleging ineffective
assistance of trial counsel and trial court error.  The District Court found that Austin’s
habeas petition was time-barred, but requested that the parties submit supplemental
briefing on the issue of whether the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled.  After
the parties submitted supplemental briefing, the District Court concluded that Austin
failed to establish that he was entitled to equitable tolling and dismissed the petition.  
We subsequently granted a certificate of appealability on the issue of whether the
District Court erred in calculating the starting point for statutory tolling under 28 U.S.C. §
2244(d)(2) as September 18, 2002, where Austin’s properly filed Rule 61 motion may
have related back to, or been deemed filed on, the original filing date of August 12, 2002. 
In addition, we asked the parties to address whether state law or federal law governs the
calculation of the starting point for statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(2), and whether
4equitable tolling is warranted under the circumstances. 
II. Discussion
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”),
prescribes a one-year statute of limitations within which a state prisoner may file a federal
habeas petition.  28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).  The one-year limitations period begins to run
from the latest of:
(A) the date on which judgment becomes final by the conclusion of direct
review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by
State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United
States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing such
state action.
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly
recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable
to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims
presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due
diligence.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (emphasis added).  Only the first provision set forth above is
implicated in this appeal.
A state court criminal judgment becomes “final” for purposes of § 2244(d)(1)(A)
“at the conclusion of review in the United States Supreme Court or when the period for
seeking certiorari review expires.”  Kapral v. United States, 166 F.3d 565, 575 (3d Cir.
1999).  Austin’s conviction undisputedly became final on November 5, 2001, the date his
deadline for filing a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court passed
 We note that Austin advanced, and the District Court rejected, a different3
statutory tolling argument in the proceedings below.  There, Austin contended that the
statutory tolling period should be extended seven days because under AEDPA, holidays
do not count in any term of tolling.  Although the argument Austin now asserts on appeal
was not raised before the District Court in the first instance, we have discretionary power
to address questions of law that may have been waived.  See Bagot v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d
252, 256 (3d Cir. 2005).  
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without his having pursued such relief.  Therefore, absent statutory or equitable tolling,
the deadline for Austin to file a federal habeas petition was scheduled to expire one year
later in November 2002.  
A. Statutory Tolling
Section 2244(d)(2) of AEDPA sets forth the following tolling provision:
The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction
or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is
pending should not be counted toward any period of limitation under this
subsection.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (emphasis added).  The parties do not dispute that Austin’s state
PCR motion tolled the one-year statute of limitations.  They do disagree, however, on
when the motion was “properly filed” and, therefore, when the statutory tolling period
commenced.   3
According to Austin, his state PCR motion was “properly filed” on August 12,
2002, irrespective of the fact that he used the wrong form.  If Austin is correct, then 279
days had elapsed between the date his conviction became final and the date on which he
filed his state PCR motion, leaving him 86 days after the Delaware Supreme Court
 In his brief, Austin states that he had until September 19, 2003, only 74 days after4
the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief.  Whether the
correct deadline is September 19 or October 1, 2003, has no bearing on the issues raised
in this appeal.
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affirmed the denial of his state PCR motion, that is until October 1, 2003,  in which to file4
a federal habeas petition.  Accordingly, Austin’s federal habeas petition, which he filed
on August 31, 2003, was timely. 
By comparison, the State contends that Austin’s state PCR motion was not
“properly filed” until September 18, 2002, when Austin refiled the motion using the
correct form.  By that time, 316 days had elapsed since Austin’s conviction had become
final, leaving only 49 days remaining in the one-year statute of limitations.  Therefore,
when the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief on July 7,
2003, Austin had only until August 25, 2003, in which to file a timely habeas petition in
federal court.  Accordingly, his August 31, 2003 filing was untimely.
In Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8-9 (2000), the Supreme Court held that an
application for state post-conviction relief 
is ‘properly filed’ when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with
the applicable rules governing filings.  These usually prescribe, for
example, the form of the document, the time limits upon its delivery, the
court and office in which it must be lodged, and the requisite filing fee.  In
some jurisdictions the filing requirements also include, for example,
preconditions imposed on particular abusive filers.
(internal citations and footnotes omitted) (second emphasis added).  As we noted in
Satterfield v. Johnson, 434 F.3d 185, 192 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo,
7544 U.S. 408, 417 (2005)), “[t]hese requirements prevent tolling because they ‘go to the
very initiation of a petition and a court’s ability to consider that petition . . . .’”
Here, the Delaware Superior Court notified Austin that his initial state PCR motion
did not comply with Delaware Superior Court Rule of Criminal Procedure 61.  The
notice, signed by Superior Court Judge Susan C. DePesco, stated:
This will acknowledge receipt of your application for postconviction
remedy.  It has been recorded as received on the date indicated above. 
However, it is being returned to you because it does not comply with
Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  The reason for its return is as follows: . .
. You must use the attached form.  
(App. 110.)  Rule 61, which governs state post-conviction proceedings, provides in
relevant part:
Form of Motion.  An application under this rule shall be made by a motion
for postconviction relief.  The movant must use the prescribed form which
shall be made available without charge by the prothonotary.  The motion
shall be typewritten or legibly handwritten.
Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(b)(1).  
The form of motion requirement set forth in Rule 61 is precisely the type of
condition to filing that the Supreme Court described in Artuz.  Because Austin failed to
comply with that requirement when he initially filed his state PCR motion on August 12,
2002, the Superior Court returned it to him with instructions to refile the motion using the
correct form.  Austin did so on September 18, 2002, and only then did the statutory tolling
period commence.
Austin argues that when he “refiled his motion on the prescribed form as directed,
8under both Delaware and federal law it was constructively filed on August 12, 2002, the
date of the original filing.”  (Appellant’s Br. at 8.)  In support of this argument, Austin
cites Delaware Superior Court Rule of Civil Procedure 15, and its federal counterpart,
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, both of which provide that, provided certain
conditions are met, “[a]n amendment of a pleading relates back to the date of the original
pleading.” See Del. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 15(c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c).  Relying on this
provision, Austin argues that his corrected September 18, 2002 filing “relates back” to his
August 12, 2002 filing.  Unfortunately, this argument is unpersuasive. 
Rule 15, in both its federal and state incarnations, governs amended and
supplemental pleadings filed in civil actions.  Here, Austin filed a motion for post-
conviction relief pursuant to Delaware Criminal Rule 61.  Rule 61 provides that, “[a]
motion may be amended as a matter of course at any time before a response is filed or
thereafter by leave of the court, which shall be freely given when justice so requires.” 
Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(b)(6).   However, even assuming that Austin’s refiling of his
state PCR motion constituted an “amendment” to his original defective motion, Rule 61
does not provide that an amendment will relate back to the original filing.  
Austin nevertheless invites us to apply Rule 15's relation back provision to Rule 61
motions for post-conviction relief.  Austin does not identify, nor have we found, any
authority that would justify this approach.  Indeed, we agree with the State that do so here
would “allow state prisoners to circumvent and defeat the purpose of the limitations
Austin also argues that Rule 61 does not constitute “an adequate and independent5
state bar” that would prevent federal habeas review.  Austin’s argument is specious since
the District Court did not dismiss Austin’s habeas petition because it found that Austin
had defaulted on his claims but rather, as discussed in this opinion, because his habeas
petition was time-barred.  In addition, Austin requests that the Court hold its decision in
this case in abeyance pending the Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence v. Florida, 421
F.3d 1221 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 1625 (U.S. Mar. 27, 2006).  We note
that the Supreme Court issued its decision in Lawrence v. Florida, No. 05-8820, 2007 WL
505972 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2007), holding that AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations for
filing a federal habeas petition is not tolled during the pendency of a petition for certiorari
to the United States Supreme Court seeking review of the denial of state post-conviction
relief.  Accordingly, Lawrence is of no help to Austin in this appeal.
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period.”  (Appellee’s Br. at 15.)  Accordingly, we reject Austin’s contention that the
statutory tolling period commenced on the date he filed his non-compliant motion for
state post-conviction relief.5
B. Equitable Tolling
We have held that AEDPA’s one year statute of limitations is subject to equitable
tolling.  LaCava, 398 F.3d at 275.  A petitioner seeking equitable tolling bears the burden
of showing that “he diligently pursued his rights and that some ‘extraordinary
circumstance stood in his way.’” Satterfield, 434 F.3d at 195 (quoting Pace, 544 U.S. at
418).  For example, equitable tolling may be appropriate if: (1) the government has
actively misled the petitioner; (2) the petitioner has in some extraordinary way been
prevented from asserting his rights; (3) the petitioner has timely asserted his rights in the
wrong forum.  Id.  We have noted, however, that “courts should be sparing in their use of
this doctrine.”  LaCava, 398 F.3d at 275.  
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Austin argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling because despite the fact that he
was diligent in pursuing his rights, his state PCR motion “languished” in the Superior
Court for two weeks before he was notified that it was non-compliant.   Assuming for
purposes of analysis only that Austin was diligent in pursuing his rights, we simply cannot
find that the two week “delay” between Austin’s filing of his defective motion for post-
conviction relief and the Superior Court’s issuance of the notice of non-compliance
would justify equitable tolling.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Austin’s
habeas petition as time-barred.
